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Abstract  
 
Taking a decision in democratic social groups (societies) is based on the opinion of the 
majority or on the consensus, if it is the case. Personalities and opinions of individuals 
constituting a social group in different stages of its development are used to be 
heterogeneous. The difference in opinions is indeed a motive to changes in a social 
group. So, the study of opinion dynamics is of great interest in analyzing social 
phenomena. Among the different models of opinion dynamics, bounded confidence 
models have been studied in different contexts and shown interesting dynamics, 
particularly in clustering, polarization and fragmentation of opinions, and influence of 
extremists [1 - 3]. In [4] we proposed a new bounded confidence model and studied the 
self-formation of opinion in heterogeneous societies composed by agents of two 
psychological types, concord (C-) and partial antagonism (PA-) agents. In this work we 
study the influence of “leaders” on the clustering of opinions in small world (SW) 
networks, starting the opinion dynamics from the uniform initial distribution of opinions 
in the network. Mixed C/PA-societies along with the pure C- and PA-society are 
studied. The influence of the leader's connectivity in the network, his toughness or 
tolerance and his opinion on the opinion dynamics is studied as a function of the initial 
opinion uncertainty (tolerance) of the population. Numerical results obtained with 
leaders at low, high and average tolerance show complex bifurcation patterns of the 
group opinion; a decrease or even the total lost of control of the leader over the society 
is observed in different intervals of tolerance of agents in the case of C/PA-societies. 
We found that in the C-society a leader showing high opinion tolerance has more 
control over the population. In the PA-society a leader changes the bifurcation pattern of 
group opinion in a drastic and unexpected way, contrary to the common sense, and 
generates stronger polarization in the opposite opinion groups; the connectivity of the 
leader is an important factor that usually improves the adhesion of agents to the leader's 
opinion. A low tolerance (authoritarian) leader has greater control over a PA-society 
than that of a high tolerance (democratic) one; the opposite result is obtained in the C-
society.  
 
Keywords: Leadership, opinion formation, agent-based simulation, social power, 
bounded confidence. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
One of the major efforts in the field of complex networks is directed to the studying of 
social phenomena on networks, where the individuals (agents) are the nodes of a 
network and the relations between them are the links. Most of the social phenomena can 
be understood or interpreted through the dynamics of opinion formation. Among them 
the search for agreements and the reaching of consensus are important aspects of social 
group dynamics that finally enhance its impact on the society. A social group is used to 
have a leader (or leaders) which influence the “social” life, in particular through the 
opinion formation. In this work we model and study a leader’s influence over the 
opinion formation in heterogeneous social groups.	  	 
The leadership can be defined in a variety of manners, but most of the definitions 
consider the leadership as the ability of a person to convince the others to reach certain 
objectives [5, 6]. In order to convince persons a leader executes his power using the 
following “tools” basically [6-9]. Compensation is done when a leader disposes and 
provides psychological and/or economical stimulus in exchange for the loyalty to the 
idea. Coercive power is based on fear, and is executed through brutal force, threats and 
punishments. Legal power is associated with the role of a chief by his formal position. 
Natural or charismatic power is based on the admiration of a leader by the followers. 
Finally, a leader can be an expert in a particular area or topic, which has a mayor 
capacity than others to analyze, control and execute the tasks.  
Each leader has its personal style of guiding a group. In general, the style depends 
on the personality of the leader, even though this can be modified by personalities of the 
subordinates or followers, the nature of the task and/or the structure of a company. A 
leader possesses a personal social-psychological style of executing a power; it can be 
authoritarian, paternalistic, advisory or democratic [6-9]. In addition, sociologists used to 
distinguish among leaders of social groups or organizations, leaders of social networks 
and mass media, even though there is much in common among those. Any model of 
social behavior and/or opinion formation is limited, so it is hardly possible to bring 
together all features mentioned above and study the leaders’ influence in a mathematical 
model. How and which of the above mentioned characteristics of a leader can be 
incorporated in a model of opinion dynamics? Under what conditions can an agent, 
possessing some leader’s qualities in terms of the variables and parameters of the 
model, act as a leader?       
Among the works on the social groups and networks there is a relatively small 
number of works on the mathematical modeling of a leader influence on the opinion 
formation. The social-psychological aspect of a leadership is used to be studied in social 
sciences and those are descriptive mainly. They propose or define the attributes of a 
leader and describe his/her behavior in the society [6-12]. The authors of [10] outline a 
method to accelerate the dissemination of innovations using opinion leaders, present 
optimal procedure and report on computer simulations that show how much faster 
diffusion occurs when initiated by opinion leaders. The topic of diffusion of opinions in 
networks is also discussed in [11]. Several attributes related to opinion leaders are 
reported in [12] after the revision of the concept of opinion leadership. On the other 
hand, the mathematical modeling of opinion formation is based mainly on the social 
physics models that take into account dynamical nature of social interactions and 
different roles of individuals [2, 13-15]. Those are physical models adapted for the 
social phenomena, in particular, the opinion formation. Being limited for the description 
of opinion formation, they have reduced capacity for incorporating leaders of different 
types in the model [16-22]. Another type of mathematical models are needed, they 
should arise from the social and psychological behavior of individuals. Mathematical 
variables and parameters of the model should describe the concepts and notions of 
social science with high fidelity from the very beginning of the modeling. Combining 
socio-psychological approaches with the quantitative mathematical tools and statistical 
physics can help to achieve reliable insights. Both approaches are important to improve 
the predictive capability of the opinion formation models. To our opinion, the bounded 
confidence, relative agreement models (BC/RA) of opinion formation [1-4] are close to 
the last requirement.  
Self-organization of opinion not influenced by leaders was studied extensively in 
the frame of C/PA model [4], giving interesting bifurcation patterns in opinion space as 
a function of opinion tolerance of agents. This agent-based model allows simulating the 
opinion formation in a mixed society constituted of agents of the two psychological 
types, concord and partial antagonism agents. Models of opinion dynamics are usually 
composed of the following basic elements: a) Opinion Space, either discrete or 
continuous; b) Updating Rule describes the change of opinion of a given agent in 
dependence on opinions of agents related to him; c) Updating Dynamics characterizes 
the interaction between agents, that can be either pair or group interaction and d) Social 
Network describes relationships between agents (social organization). Each and every 
of these elements contribute different way to the opinion formation in a society. Since 
the leadership is an intrinsic characteristic of a social group, the influence of a leader on 
the opinion evolution and formation is an important thing to study. In [4] was found that 
the opinion formation to be similar in the networks of the following three types: Erdös–
Rényi random graphs, Watts-Strogatz small-world networks and complete graphs. In 
this work we limited our study to the small world networks only.  
The leadership is the ability of an individual to convince the others to reach certain 
objectives. Leader of opinion has to influence the opinion of “subordinates-followers” 
in a way that they adopt the vision of the leader; he/she has to be firm. Because a leader 
maintains a course in order to approach the goal, we consider as a leader an agent which 
maintains an invariable opinion in the process of social opinion formation. Another 
distinguishing feature that helps a leader to execute the power is its relatively high 
connectivity into the social network. In addition, we control the leader’s tolerance to 
simulate authoritarian, paternalistic, advisory or democratic leader. The social power of 
a leader is modeled partially via the connectivity of the leader in the network and 
through the relative agreement of the updating rule. In order to see separately different 
effects of the leader’s influence on the opinion formation, in this work we consider a 
unique leader of the social group. It should be noted that a mass media can be treated 
somehow as a leader of opinion by itself, or as a tool of a leader.   
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we give a brief qualitative 
description of a leader and trends in modeling of opinion dynamics in social groups 
with leaders. A model of opinion dynamics in a mixed C/PA society is presented in 
Section 2. In Section 3 we incorporate a leader into the C/PA model of opinion 
dynamics, using variables and parameters of the model. Section 4 presents results of 
computer simulation. Finally, conclusions and discussion is given in Section 5.   
 
2. C/PA model of opinion dynamics  
 
Social groups are constituted of persons of different psychological types [14, 15]. In 
order to capture this important feature of social organization, in [4] was proposed a 
model of opinion in a mixed C/PA society which consists of agents of two 
psychological types, partial antagonism (PA-) and concord (C-) agents. The model uses 
interval S = [−1, 1] as a continuous opinion space. In addition, each agent i is 
characterized by his opinion uncertainty or tolerance ui ∈ (0, 1]. An opinion segment si 
= [xi − ui, xi + ui] is assigned to each agent i. For two agents, i and j, their opinion 
segments overlap if and only if hij = min(xi + ui, xj + uj) − max(xi − ui, xj − uj) > 0, where 
hij is called an opinion overlap. In the C/PA-model the opinion and uncertainty of 
passive (receptive) agent j are changed when 0 ≤ hij. Agents of the two types differs 
each other in the way they update their opinion in pair interaction. The updating rule for 
the opinion and uncertainty of a passive C-agent j is as follows:  
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where the active agent can be either a C- or PA-agent. Note that the interaction of C-
agents is always attractive similar to that of [3], that gives the name to concord agents. 
Agents with partial antagonism represent the other psychological type. Since real life 
interaction between persons is usually repulsive-attractive, we define the updating factor 
of this type of agents in such a way that opinions of two interacting agents can diverge. 
The new updating rule for the opinion and uncertainty of a passive PA-agent j is as 
follows:  
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where active agent i can be C- or PA-type. Note that the relative agreement (hij / 2ui)(hij / 
ui − 1) ∈ [−0.125, 1], thus the opinions of PA-agents can diverge from that of active 
agents when 0)1/( ≤−iij uh . The C/PA society of N agents consists of two sub-
populations, MC and MPA of pN and (1 − p)N size respectively, where a fraction of C-
agents, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 is a parameter of the model. When an active agent i interacts with a 
passive one j, agent j changes its opinion and uncertainty following the updating rules 
for the C-agents, Eqs. (1) and (2), if j ∈ MC or those for the PA-agents, Eqs. (3) and (4), 
if j ∈ MPA. Varying the value of p from 0 to 1, we model mixed C/PA-societies with 
populations ranging through the pure C- to the PA-society.  
The behavioral patterns of the two types (C- and PA-) proposed and exploited in our 
work are typical for social groups but each of them has no unique socio-psychological 
mechanism; other patterns can vary around in details and differ in mathematical 
representation depending on the variables and parameters of the model. The every day 
experience suggests that the simplest way to see psychological reaction of an individual 
is to refuse or accept the opinion of the “opponent”. When the opinion of the 
“opponent” is accepted, the most probable result is that the opinions getting closer. 
Nevertheless, in order to accept an opinion of the other, an individual have to have an 
opinion close enough to that of the opponent and, in addition, to be confident in the 
opponent psychologically. The latter is a psychological factor that, to certain extent, 
should to be measured independently of the opinion. If an individual has no sufficient 
confidence in the “opponent”, he will most probably refuse the opponent’s opinion; if 
the unidirectional confidence is sufficiently high, the opinions most probably get closer. 
This is a tiny moment not simple to express mathematically. Being limited in the 
variables, we were forced to express this mechanism mathematically in terms of opinion 
and uncertainty (opinion tolerance) only, as it is described in Eqs. (3) and (4). It is 
difficult to encounter the situation when individuals having very close opinions and 
confidence each in other will reject the opinion of opponent. Because the refuse of 
opponent’s opinion can hardly be total, we consider the situation of partial antagonism. 
In our model we treat completely confident individuals as a special group of concord 
agents. No socio-psychological study has been done to justify the specific mathematical 
relation (PA) used in these works. These are mostly heuristic relations. 
 
 
3. Model leader in the mixed C/PA-society       
 
We consider leadership as the ability of a person to guide individuals (agents) to a goal. 
So, a leader needs to be able to communicate ideas to agents and convince them [5, 6]. 
To communicate implies that the leader can interact with a relatively large portion of 
population, directly or implicitly. To convince implies having some kind of “power” of 
opinion manipulation. This “power” can be either natural (charismatic leaders), given 
by some degree of reputation or experience, or implemented by some means such as a 
reward or even coercion. Another important characteristic of the leader is his ability to 
take into consideration other’s opinion. From this point of view, a leader can be 
democratic or autocratic (dictator). Since any opinion model is limited, we represent 
these features in the following way. Our leader is an agent connected with a significant 
part of population; his degree of connectivity with other agents of the society, denoted 
by dl runs through 0.2 to 1. Because a leader has a goal (an objective) and strong 
conviction to reach it, we assign an invariable opinion to the leader, denoted hereafter 
by xl. This can be viewed as a straightforward strategy of the leader. The “democracy 
level” of the leader is represented by his uncertainty or tolerance, ul. We suppose that a 
dictator (authoritarian leader) has invariable low tolerance ul = 0.2, whereas a 
democratic leader has invariable, relatively high tolerance ul = 0.5. We also expect that 
the leader’s tolerance can be equal to that of the rest of population, ul = U, where U is 
the average of initial tolerance of population; in that case the leader is called populist.  
Social power is rather complicated socio-psychological notion. In this model it is 
regulated by the two magnitudes. First, it is the degree of connectivity of a leader in the 
network that is a reflection of his communicability and his social power. Second, the 
relative agreement between agents “i” and “j” regulates the magnitude of changing in 
the opinion of “passive” agent “j”. Therefore, it represents the social power of an active 
agent “i”, and, in particular, of a leader that is considered as an active agent always. For 
the passive agent “j” of the C-type, the relative agreement is equal to iijC uha /= , Eq. 
(1). When the passive agent “j” is of the PA-type, the relative agreement is equal to 
2/)1(2/)1/( CClljlljPA aauhuha −=−= , Eq. (3).  
In practice, every leader usually uses a combination of powers, but not the only one. 
Different combinations of connectivity and tolerance can be considered as a combined, 
integral representation of leader´s powers. For example, in a professional group, 
probably the most important of the leader´s powers is the professional reputation, but 
charisma and reward can not be excluded and certainly are present; they enhance the 
reputation power. In this model, the reputation can be considered as a combination of a 
relatively high tolerance and connectivity. Charisma is a psychological quality, and in 
the frame of this model it can be partially attributed to a relatively high tolerance; the 
latter is a feature of a populist also. As for the connectivity, it can be considered as a 
part of a strategy that can be used by a leader to reach a desired result.   
 When a leader is a “dictator” (coercive power, perhaps enhanced with a reputation 
and rewards), he used to have a low tolerance (no charisma) and fixed opinion; and, 
most probably, he will need high connectivity and/or hierarchical structure of the 
society to control the opinion or, at least, the opinion expression. 
Note that the way we conceive and implement the leader can be used to model 
different situations where a kind of leadership is necessary, for example, leaders of 
social groups or organizations or leaders of social networks. In particular, adjusting 
parameters attributed to the leader we can simulate the effect of mass media in the 
opinion dynamics of population.   
 
 
4. Results of computer simulation  
 
In this work we are mainly interested in the asymptotic, stationary distribution of 
opinion in the society. This implies that a leader has quite enough time to work with the 
agents and convince them if it is the case. Since we are interested in the final state of the 
opinion, we do not study opinion convergence in time, leaving this important detail for 
future work.  
In order to appreciate changes in the opinion formation caused by the presence of a 
leader in a social network, we studied numerically the patterns of opinion distribution 
on the Small World (SW) networks of PA- and C-agents, in function of the parameter U 
ranging through 0.3 to 1.2, where U is the average of initial tolerance of population. 
Results for 1≥U  has theoretical but not practical sense, because it is hardly expect that 
almost all population has so big opinion uncertainty in the opinion space ]1,1[−∈ix . 
Leader’s attributes, his connectivity dl to the network, tolerance (uncertainty of leader’s 
opinion) ul and opinion xl were varied in a wide range of values. Note that the opinion xl 
is kept invariable during the evolution of the society opinion.    
We wonder to know, how does a model leader change the bifurcation pattern of 
opinion compared to that in the society without leader? In order to simulate the 
influence of a leader on the opinion formation in the mixed C/PA-model we use the 
following methodology. The society of individuals is a small world network with N = 
1000 agents. The state variables of the society are the opinion xi and the uncertainty ui 
of individuals (agents), i = 1,2, …N. Uniform probability distribution is used to choose 
the initial opinion of agents from the interval [-1, 1] and uncertainty from the interval 
[U − 0.2, U + 0.2], where U is the average initial opinion uncertainty of the population. 
We add to the network a leader with the opinion xl and uncertainty ul by connecting him 
randomly to dlN agents, where dl is the connectivity of the leader in the network. At 
each time step, we choose randomly N edges (pairs of coupled agents) of the network. If 
one of these agents is the leader, then his partner is chosen to be the passive agent 
always; this guarantees that the leader does not change his opinion and uncertainty. If 
neither of the pair of agents is a leader, then one of them is selected at random to be the 
active agent i, while the other is considered to be the passive one, j. In our study we 
suppose that, in the process of opinion evolution in time, the dictator has invariable low 
tolerance ul = 0.2, whereas a democratic leader has invariable, relatively high tolerance 
ul = 0.5 through all the range of the average initial opinion uncertainty U. As for the 
populist leader we expect that his/her tolerance is similar to the rest of population, ul = 
U. 
The value of the opinion overlap hij is computed, and we update variables of the 
passive agent if and only if hij ≥ 0. As mentioned above, the composition of 
heterogeneous society is regulated with the parameter 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. When an active agent i 
interacts with a passive one j, agent j changes its attitude according to the C-type rules if 
j ∈ MC, or the PA-type rules if j ∈ MPA. The value of the parameter U runs through 0.3 
to 1.2 at the step of 0.01. At each value of U, we execute 350 iterations (time steps). 
Because we are basically interested in the steady state of opinion dynamics, we plot the 
density of asymptotic opinion distribution as a function of parameter U. The results 
shown in the following figures represent an average over 50 simulations for each value 
of U.   
Figure 1 shows bifurcation patterns for the societies without leaders as the 
reference; those are calculated just under the same conditions as for the societies with 
leaders, presented in this work. This comparison is instructive for the studying of 
natural competition between the self-organization of the society and the influence of a 
leader on the opinion formation.  
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Figure 1. Bifurcation patterns of opinion in the C/PA-societies without leaders on the SW networks: a) C-
society (p = 1); b) Mixed C/PA-society (p = 0.5) and c) PA-society (p = 0.0)  
 
 
 
Our experiments pretend to answer the question: Under what conditions does an 
agent act as a leader of opinion? That is, when he attracts opinions of the majority of 
individuals? To answer the question, in computer simulations we varied the following 
parameters of the model. For each C/PA composition of the society running through 
0/100, 20/80, 40/60, 60/40, 80/20 and 100/0 (p = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and 1), the leader’s 
parameters were given the following values: opinion xl = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8; his 
tolerance ul = 0.2, 0.5 and U; his degree dl = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and 1. Bifurcation patterns 
and plots of temporal evolution of opinion demonstrated a variety of interesting details 
and tendencies; those are hardly possible to comment in detail in one article. So, in 
order to resume most of the results in this article we selected only few of them, those 
being most representative cases in our opinion.  
Behavior of concord agents is rather simple and predictable. In Figure 1 we see that 
the consensus centered at the opinion x = 0 prevails in the C-society without leader, for 
the uniform initial distribution of opinion at values 4.0≥U , although the small 
fragmentation of opinion is observed at values U less than 0.4. As expected, we found 
that the centrist leader, xl = 0, of any type only enhances the convergence to the unique 
opinion x = 0. The consensus is always observed in the C-society, for the democratic (ul 
= 0.5) and the populist (ul = U) leader; two small groups of separatists with opinions x = 
0.5 and x = -05 are observed at U close to 0.3 with a dictator (ul = 0.2) at all values of 
his degree. So, the dominant opinion distribution in the C-society is the consensus, x = 0 
in the presence of a centrist leader of any type, having the degree dl = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 
and 1; for that reason we omit the corresponding plots.  
The patterns of asymptotic opinion distribution in the PA-society strongly differ to 
that of the C-society, with and without leaders (for example, compare the bifurcation 
patterns of Figure 1a and 1c). Computer simulations on the opinion formation in the 
PA-society with the centrist leader show that the asymptotic opinion distribution over 
the network is similar, except small quantitative details, in the society guided by the 
democratic leader, ul = 0.5 and by the populist, ul = U. For that reason we present 
opinion distribution only for the democratic leader, see Figure 2, line A. In both cases 
we observe strong generation of opposed extremists and incapacity of a “leader” to 
dominate the opinion of self-organized regular agents, in the interval 0.5 < U < 1.0 (see 
Figure 1c also). These effects are modified quantitatively (but not qualitatively) with the 
degree of a leader (see Figure 2, line A). Nevertheless, a low tolerance leader (dictator) 
used to dominate the society opinion at a relatively high connectivity, dl > 0.6; that is 
not the case at dl = 0.2 when the dictator has little control in the interval 0.3 < U < 0.6 
and looses it in the interval of 0.6 < U < 1.0 (see Figure 2, line B).   
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  (a)    (b)    (c)  
Figure 2. Bifurcation patterns of opinion in the PA-society, on the SW networks, guided by a centrist 
democratic leader, ul  = 0.5, line A and a “dictator”, ul  = 0.2, line B: column (a) dl = 0.2; (b) dl = 0.6 and 
(c) dl = 1.0 
 
 
 
In real life it is hardly possible to meet homogeneous social groups composed of 
agents of the same psychological type. So, having in mind specific features of the 
opinion formation in pure C- and PA-society we wonder to see the influence of a leader 
on the opinion formation in mixed societies. Even though we have results of computer 
simulation for the fractions of C/PA agents through 0/100, 20/80, 40/60, 60/40, 80/20 
and 100/0, we consider appropriate to show and analyze here the plots in the case of 
C/PA-40/60 that reveals general tendencies, Figure 3.   
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  (a)    (b)    (c)  
Figure 3. Bifurcation patterns of opinion in the C/PA-40/60 society, on the SW networks, guided by a 
centrist democratic leader, ul  = 0.5, line A; populist leader ul = U, line B and a “dictator”, ul  = 0.2, line 
C: column (a) dl = 0.2; (b) dl = 0.6 and (c) dl = 1.0 
 
 
 
Asymptotic opinion distribution over the network is similar, except some 
quantitative details, in the society guided by a democratic leader, ul = 0.5 and a populist 
ul = U; see Figure 3, lines A and B. Nevertheless, the low tolerance leader (“dictator”) 
shows surprisingly different results in opinion formation; those are given in Figure 3, 
line C. Dictator demonstrates much better performance; he dominates the society 
opinion for U > 0.4 and does not loose the governability in any interval of U in contrast 
to that of the populist or democratic leader. Another interesting feature of this opinion 
dynamics is that centrist leaders of any tolerance used to generate extremists. 
Bifurcation patterns are modified in function of the leader’s degree (connectivity). 
Those general tendencies are also observed in the mixed societies at C/PA ratio equal to 
20/80, 40/60, 60/40 and 80/20, with notable variations in quantitative details through the 
society composition.   
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  (a)    (b)    (c)  
Figure 4. Bifurcation patterns of opinion in the C/PA-80/20 society guided by a centrist democratic 
leader, ul  = 0.5, line A; populist leader ul  = U, line B and a “dictator”, ul  = 0.2, line C: column (a) dl = 
0.2; (b) dl = 0.6 and (c) dl = 1.0 
 
 
 
From Figure 4 we see that the presence of even 20% of PA-agents changes 
significantly both the dynamics and the final distribution of opinion in the mixed C/PA-
80/20 society compared to that of the pure C-society; in particular, we observe intervals 
of U where the centrist “leader” notably looses control over the opinion of regular 
agents. It is a result of competition between the self-organization of opinion of agents 
and the open loop control of the leader over their opinions. There is also an initial, 
symmetric repulsion of agents from the leader and then their self-organization in the 
opposite groups. Note that Figure 4 has notable correlation with the case of C/PA – 
40/60, Figure 3.  
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Figure 5. Bifurcation patterns of opinion in the SW network as a function of U, for the leader’s opinion xl 
= 0.6 and the degree dl = 0.2. Row A, pure C-society (p = 1); row B, mixed C/PA-society (p = 0.4) and 
row C, pure PA-society (p = 0). Columns: (a) dictator, ul = 0.2; (b) populist, ul = U and (c) democratic 
leader, ul = 0.5. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 shows, in series of plots, the influence of a leader, having well defined “right” 
orientation, 6.0=lx  and a relatively low degree of connectivity, 2.0=ld  on the 
opinion formation in the C-, PA- and mixed C/PA-40/60-society; leaders of the three 
types are considered.  Comparing figures in columns (a) and (c) in Figure 5, we see that 
in general a democratic leader and a dictator, with relatively low degree-connectivity 
(0.2), get similar results; those differ from that of the populist (compare columns (a) and 
(c) versus (b)). In the C-society, the populist, Uul =  and democratic leader, 5.0=lu  
with relatively low degree (of connectivity), dl = 0.2 have almost the same control over 
the final opinion of regular agents; they clearly dominate agents’ opinions if the initial 
tolerance (uncertainty) of the population 4.0≥U , the distribution of opinion having the 
bifurcation and fragmentation of opinion at values 4.0<U . The dictator, 2.0=lu , also 
gets control over the opinion of agents, but in the societies with the higher tolerance, 
5.0≥U . For the less values of U, the group opinion suffers notable fragmentation and 
the dictator does not get control over it.  
In the C/PA-40/60-society (Figure 5, line B), a dictator and a democratic leader get 
similar control over the agents’ opinions, and they are quite efficient in that issue for the 
societies with agents whose tolerance 5.0≥U . But the populist is less efficient and he 
gets only partial control over the opinion of population in some intervals of the initial 
tolerance of population, U. Leader of any type induces generation of the left extremists,  
1−=x , in the interval 16.0 ≤≤U . 
In case of the PA-society, the patterns of opinion bifurcation look more 
complicated, Figure 5, line C. The control of agents’ opinion by a dictator and a 
democratic leader is similar, except quantitative details; in general, they control 
efficiently the opinion of population at values 5.0≥U . As for the populist, his control 
of opinion is little efficient. In the interval 2.16.0 ≤≤U , he gets a number of followers, 
but at the same time he provokes a generation of extremists, both left and right 
orientation (see Figure 5 (C, b)). Extremists opposing leader’s opinion even exceed his 
followers in number. Bifurcation of opinion is observed at 5.0=U . As a result of this 
bifurcation a large group of left opponents, then becoming left extremists, emerges. In 
addition, a group of right oriented opponents, becoming right extremists, splits of the 
group of the leader’s followers. This bifurcation pattern can be interpreted as the 
competition of the self-organization of opinions of agents and the open loop control of a 
leader over their opinions; a leader with opinion xl = 0.6 at U > 0.55 attracts a 
supporting group of agents, which repulse the opinion of the opposite groups to the left 
and right extremes accompanied by the effects of self-organization of the extreme 
groups.  
The plots of column (b) in Figure 5 show that the populist “leader” succeeds in 
dominating of public opinion in the C-society only; in mixed C/PA-societies there are 
intervals of U where the populist looses the control over the public opinion, and this 
effect is more notorious in societies with a big PA-component of population. It should 
be noted that this tendency is observed for different values of p and connectivity of the 
leader.   
 
 
 
     
  (a)    (b)    (c)  
Figure 6. Bifurcation patterns of opinion distribution as a function of U in the mixed C/PA-40/60 society 
for xl = 0.6 and high degree of a leader dl = 0.8: (a) dictator, ul = 0.2; (b) populist, ul = U and (c) 
democratic leader, ul = 0.5. 
 
 
 
In order to show the influence a leader with a relatively high connectivity, in Figure 6 
we present the bifurcation patterns of opinion in the mixed C/PA-40/60 society for xl = 
0.6 and dl = 0.8 (high connectivity). Even though the dictator used to attract the opinion 
of a numerous group of agents for the society with the tolerance in the interval 
2.13.0 ≤≤U , his control becomes efficient for U≤8.0  only (see Figure 6a). The 
populist is an efficient leader for the societies with a modest tolerance, 85.045.0 ≤≤U , 
but then he looses a control (see Figure 6b). From Figure 6c we see that the democratic 
leader joins the power of both, the populist and dictator, getting an efficient control over 
the society in the interval 2.13.0 ≤≤U . Democratic leader (ul = 0.5) becomes a kind of 
a dictator for the agents with U > 0.5. For that reason his behavior is similar to that of 
the dictator for U > 0.5 (see Fig. 6a). In this situation the democratic leader controls 
opinions of agents; there is no gap, as it is observed in the case of the populist. Groups 
of left extremists and dissidents are observed in Figure 6. These tendencies where 
observed in different mixed societies with highly connected leaders. Comparing of 
Figure 6 with Figure 5, row B shows the importance of leader’s degree for its 
performance. Note that leaders with high degree of connectivity in the networks can be 
interpreted as mass media to some extent.  
 
 
 
     
  (a)    (b)    (c)  
Figure 7. Bifurcation patterns of opinion distribution as a function of U in a pure PA-society for xl = 0.2 
and dl = 0.2: (a) dictator, ul = 0.2; (b) populist, ul = U and (c) democratic leader, ul = 0.5. 
 
 
 
In order to see more details and analyze the influence of a leader with a modest 
right or left orientation, that is the intermediate case between the centrist and extreme 
oriented leader, we present in Figure 7 the series of graphics for the pure PA-society 
and leader’s opinion xl = 0.2 and dl = 0.2; the latter means that the leader is almost 
centrist and has relatively low degree of connectivity. In this situation a dictator 
succeeds to get a control over the society, even though small groups of dissidents are 
observed for U > 0.4, Figure 7a. However, both the populist and democratic “leader” 
looses control over the society in the interval 1.13.0 ≤≤U , Figure 7b, c. Moreover, 
there are two groups of dissidents positioned in opposite sides of opinion space. The 
opinion distribution is not symmetric and the group of left dissidents and extremists is 
always larger than that of the right oriented agents (note that the leader is right oriented 
modestly). Bifurcation patterns of Figure 7 show that the characteristics attributed to the 
model leader are not always sufficient to guarantee a control over the society.  
 
 
5. Conclusions and discussion   
 
In this work we have proposed the model and studied the competition between the self-
organization of opinion of agents in the network and the influence of a leader over the 
public opinion. We have introduced model leaders of the authoritarian (dictator), 
democratic and populist types in the heterogeneous C/PA model of opinion dynamics. A 
“leader” of the network opinion is an agent to which are assigned an invariable opinion 
and uncertainty (tolerance), and a relatively high degree of connectivity in the network. 
In this work we have shown, those are necessary but not sufficient conditions for an 
agent to be a leader. To be an efficient leader one needs to posses some more qualities 
than high degree of connectivity ld  and invariable opinion lx  and tolerance lu ; model 
leader, at least, has to assess the psychological type of participants (C/PA-agents) of the 
group and their tolerance U. In some respects the hubs could be thought as model 
leaders since they are high degree nodes in scale-free networks. Nevertheless, it is not 
intrinsic feature of an agent, but it is a topological property of the network that reflects a 
social position of the hub to some extent. In addition, hubs are numerous formations in 
the scale-free networks. The question is who is a leader? In this sense, any pair of hubs 
considered as leaders can have identical, similar or opposite opinions; these situations 
will produce different results. All of these qualities of hubs complicate, if not confuse 
the understanding of the leader’s influence upon the opinion formation in a social group 
(network). In order to better the understanding of the mechanism of a leadership, in this 
work we have considered a unique leader in homogeneous networks. Small world 
networks were used to model the opinion dynamics of a society.  
We have found that the opinion formation in a society is sensitive to both the 
psychological type of agents (C- and PA-agents) and the type of a “leader”. In our 
experiments we observed the following tendencies.  
Individual behavior of C-agents is rather simple, Eq. (1) and (2). Nevertheless, even 
in the pure C-society a control of public opinion by a leader is quite complicated. The 
opinion distribution in the C-society, in the presence of the dictator with the opinion in 
the interval ]04,4.0[−∈lx , is the consensus centered at the leader’s opinion lx , for the 
leader’s degrees of connectivity dl  = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1 and 35.0≥U . However, when 
a dictator has more extremist position, 8.0,6.0 ±±=lx , he almost looses control over 
the public opinion for 6.03.0 ≤≤U , getting a small number of followers at high 
degrees  dl  =  0.8, 1 only. For the societies with a high uncertainty (tolerance), 6.0>U , 
even a dictator with a radical opinion used to establish control and dominate public 
opinion. In the C-society the populist and democratic leader in general have better 
performance than that of a dictator in all range of parameters, the democratic leader 
being the best.   
In general, model leader of any type has more problems with the control of opinion 
in the C/PA-societies with a notable portion of PA-agents. The population with at most 
20% of PA-agents used to suffer multiple opinion fragmentations. There are intervals of 
opinion tolerance U, especially for societies with a notable PA-component, when the 
model leader looses control over the society (see Figures 2, 3, 4, 5, 7). In the case with 
the populist or democratic leader, we observe strong generation of opposed extremists 
and incapacity of a “leader” to convince regular agents, in the interval 0.5 < U < 1.0 
(see Figures 2A, 3A and 3B, 4A and 4B, 5B and 5C). In the societies with a notable 
portion of PA-agents the overall performance of the dictator in guiding the public 
opinion is better than that of the populist or democratic leader; that is in contrast with 
the C-society. In general, the attraction of a leader increases in function of the leader’s 
degree of connectivity with the network but it is not a linear effect. 
With the global study of asymptotic trends in opinion evolution it is possible to 
detect interesting or unusual situations in opinion formation under the leaders influence. 
When an interesting global situation is observed, then it is just the case to study the 
scenery in more details, including time evolution of opinion of individuals and their 
positioning or connectivity in the network. Results of our modeling and simulation 
suggest that, besides the features mentioned above, leaders need more sophisticated 
strategies to maintain the control over societies characterized by a high degree of 
mistrust and antagonism. We think that some of the results can be applied also to the 
effect of mass media onto the dynamics of public opinion formation. Competition of 
leaders, leader’s strategies, different kinds of the social power of leaders, and the 
network topology are expected to affect the opinion formation; those are natural 
extensions of this work for the future. We expect that the C/PA-model with leaders 
helps to explain some tendencies in opinion formation in heterogeneous societies 
composed of agents similar to those of the C- and PA-type.  
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Appendix  
 
Time evolution of opinions is occurred in a variety of ways, depending on the C/PA-
society composition, leader’s opinion lx  and tolerance lu , leaders connectivity ld  and 
the average opinion uncertainty of agents U. So many parameters suggest the topic of 
the time convergence of opinions to be studied mathematically rigorously or by means 
of practical computer runs for particular sceneries described by a specific set of values 
of model parameters. Since the aim of this work is to see the global statistical trends in 
opinion formation in societies composed of agents of different “psychological” type, we 
did not use any formal mathematical criterion to control the time convergence of 
opinions. Based on the previous experience and some probe runs, we chose for this 
work an intermediate way to “control” the convergence. In each experiment we have 
fixed the values of the following parameters: C/PA-society composition, leader’s 
opinion and tolerance xl and ul, leaders connectivity dl and the average opinion 
uncertainty of agents U; besides, we generate new network (of the same type and same 
number of agents), new uniform distribution of opinions and uncertainties of agents. We 
let the system evolve for 500 “time” steps. Each time step involves N pair interactions. 
Then final opinion distributions of 50 experiments are averaged to give the trend of 
opinion formation (one point in a plot of Figures 1 to 7). We verified visually the 
convergence of the opinion formation in many sampled (not in all) runs, and observed 
that 500 “time” steps is reasonable evolution time to see the asymptotic opinion 
distribution. Moreover, if the experiments were not stable asymptotically or if there was 
no convergence in opinion formation, then the opinion distribution averaged over 50 
experiments would give almost uniform distribution, and that is not the case.      
Three figures illustrate some ways of convergence, but we observed many more 
interesting details in other sceneries that worth to be studied and commented rigorously 
in a separate work.  
	  
Figure A. Time evolution of opinions in a pure C-society: PA000/C100, xl = 0.6, ul = 0.2, dl = 0.6 and U = 
0.6.  
	  
Figure B. Time evolution of opinions in a pure PA-society: PA100/C000, xl = 0, ul = 0.5, dl = 0.6 and U = 
0.4. 
	  Figure C. Time evolution of opinions in a pure mixed C/PA-society: PA60/C40, xl = 0, ul = 0.2, dl = 0.2 
and U = 0.6. 
	  
Group opinion convergence in time was observed in all cases of sampled evolution 
plots, even though interesting details are observed at early stages of opinion evolution, 
especially. Time convergence of opinions in presence of a populist (ul = U) and 
democratic leader (ul  = .50) is similar. In any case, 500 “time” steps show the trends of 
opinion formation clearly.  
Some of the observed features of opinion evolution are as follows. C-society 
(Figure A): Two stages of group opinion evolution are clearly observed. First stage is a 
relatively rapid self-organization of opinions in a compact cluster (20 to 50 “time” 
steps, depends on dl and U), and then the cluster of opinions tends to the opinion of the 
leader, if it is the case. PA-society (Figure B): Opinion groups are usually formed at 50 
to 120 “time” steps. Mixed PA60/C40-society (Figure C): Self-organization of 
opinions of agents and adhesion of opinions of other agents to the opinion of leader are 
observed simultaneously. The larger U, the less is the convergence time. The larger dl, 
the slower is the convergence in self-organized groups of opinion that do not share the 
opinion of a leader. Opinion convergence in a mixed C/PA-society is usually slower 
than in the case of pure C- or PA-societies at the same values of parameters.  
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